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Truth and (Sleeping) Beauty: all ye need to know.
Beauty is a rational agent participating in an experiment in which a coin is tossed on
Sunday night. She is awakened Monday morning, asked her credence in heads and told
the outcome. If the coin landed heads, that’s the end of the experiment. If tails, Beauty
is given a drug that puts her to sleep for another 24 hours and erases all memory of her
Monday awakening. Then on Tuesday morning she is again awakened, asked her credence
in heads, told the outcome, and that’s the end of the experiment. The problem is what
Beauty’s personal credence in heads should be on Monday morning. A halfer says one-half.
A thirder says one-third. I maintain that Beauty’s credences are underspecified, and will
defend versions of both solutions.
1. The naive solution: thirding.
I will begin this section with a positive argument for thirding, then address some recently
raised doubts about thirding. The positive argument is intended to be merely representa-
tive, though it may have no exact extant counterpart. Most halfers, including Lewis [6],
have maintained that Beauty gains no information from Sunday night to Monday morning.
Many thirders, for example Horgan [4], think that Beauty does gain information, and that
this is the basis for her change in credence. I hold with those who maintain that Beauty
loses (de se) information.1
A reflection principle attributed to Van Fraassen states that if at some future time (after
conditioning on some partition, to be more accurate–more about this later) one has ex-
pected credence r in event E, then they should have credence r in E now. I’ll be employing
for my argument an inverse reflection principle which says that if one has lost information
(again subject to some “partition” condition) potentially relevant to E, and knows their
prior credence in E, they should revert to the prior credence.
The argument runs as follows. Let x be Beauty’s credence in heads during an awakening.
I will assume that Beauty accepts Elga’s “restricted principle of indifference” [1], which
says that P (Monday tails) and P (Tuesday tails) share a common value, here 1
2
(1 − x).
She knows she has lost information regarding when the coin was tossed, and suspects that
this information is potentially relevant to heads. By the inverse reflection principle, her
credences should revert to what they were prior to the loss. If it is Monday, to those
of Sunday night–namely 12 , and if it is Tuesday, to those of (on the naive view) Monday
night–namely zero. If Beauty doesn’t know what day it is, she should use the weighted
average 1
2
· P (Monday) + 0 · P (Tuesday) = 1
2
( 1
2
(1 + x)) = 1
4
+ 1
4
x. On the other hand her
credence in heads is x, so we get x = 1
4
+ 1
4
x, which has solution x = 1
3
.
1On Sunday night Beauty knows that the coin was flipped in the previous 24 hours. On
Monday morning, she doesn’t. At first blush the information lost appears to be at least
potentially relevant to heads, for conditioned on the experiment still going on, credence in
heads clearly depends on whether or not the coin was flipped in the previous 24 hours.
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So much for the positive argument; I move now to the defense. Ross in [8] claims that the
one-third solution is at odds with the principle that rational credences should be countably
additive. I believe his argument is essentially correct, but will advise that the conclusion
has more limited scope than has been acknowledged. At nomically accessible worlds, in
particular, rational thirders should not feel threatened.
Ross begins by defining a general “Sleeping Beauty problem” to be “a problem in which a
fully rational agent, Beauty, will undergo one or more mutually indistinguishable awaken-
ings...” where the number of such awakenings is a function of a discrete random variable
into a set S of hypotheses. His argument then proceeds by means of a pathological Sleeping
Beauty problem in which the expected number of awakenings is infinite, starting with the
claim that thirders are commited to the following “indifference principle”:
Finitistic Sleeping Beauty Indifference (FSBI). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, for
any hypothesis h in S, if the number of times Beauty awakens conditional on h is
finite, then upon first awakening, Beauty should have equal credence in each of the
awakening possibilities associated with h.
FSBI, together with some additional premises, leads to the following:
Generalized Thirder Principle (GTP). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, upon first
awakening, Beauty’s credence in any given hypothesis in S must be proportional
to the product of the hypothesis’ objective chance and the number of times Beauty
will awaken conditional on this hypothesis.
The pathological example to follow shows that GTP is in conflict with:
Countable Additivity (CA). For any set of countably many centered or uncentered
propositions, any two of which are incompatible, rationality requires that one’s
credences in the propositions in this set sum to one’s credence in their disjunction.
Here is the example.2
Sleeping Beauty in St. Petersburg (SBSP). Let S = N and suppose that Beauty
awakens 2X times, where X is a random variable with P (X = n) = 2−n, n ∈ N.
If Beauty subscribes to GTP, then in SBSP it would appear that she must assign equal
credences to the exhaustive and mutually exclusive assertions X = n, which violates CA.
It’s easy to see how this argument could become popular–it’s counterintuituve and seem-
2For those who know of such things, the original problem is basically a positive recurrent
Markov chain, the one-third solution deriving from its stationary probability measure,
while SBSP is a null recurrent chain, for which all stationary distributions are infinite. That
null recurrent chains are essentially useless as models for nomic phenomena is generally
accepted; see e.g. [2], in particular Example 6.1.1 and Section 6.9 (chapter summary).
What saves thirders is that this limitation is not shared by positive recurrent chains.
2
ingly plausible at worlds where a literal reading of FSBI, indeed an apparent premise of
thirders, can be rationally defended. At our world, however, thirders can’t rationally sanc-
tion a literal interpretation of FSBI, as they know that with non-zero probability, Beauty
will die between tails awakenings. That thirders have failed to be explicit about mortal
contingencies (which would rightly be perceived as tedious) is, I think, innocent. Ignoring
such remote possibilities simplifies the thirder model, and of course their effect on Beauty’s
credence function vanishes with increasing remoteness. Ignoring mortality in the class of
examples to which SBSP belongs, however, surrenders one to pathology. Indeed, SBSP is
so sensitive to conditions of implementation that acknowledging any prospect for mortality
whatsoever (that Beauty might be transformed into a marble bust of Pascal by unfortunate
quantum effects will do) eliminates any perceived conflict with CA.
Some details: when Beauty is explicit about mortality, she employs not FSBI but:
Sleeping Beauty Partiality (SBP). If the number of times Beauty awakens is M ,
then for any hypothesis h in S, upon first awakening, Beauty’s credence in the kth
awakening associated with h should be proportional to Ch(M ≥ k|h).
Here Ch(·) is objective chance. SBP, together with other plausible hypotheses (first night
mortality rates independent of h and credences in first h awakenings proportional to
Ch(h)), implies that Beauty’s absolute credence in the kth awakening associated with
h should be
P (h ∧ k) =
Ch(h) · Ch(M ≥ k|h)∑
j∈S,l∈NCh(j) · Ch(M ≥ l|j)
=
Ch(h) · Ch(M ≥ k|h)
E(M)
.
Summing over k ∈ N, Beauty’s credence in h should be
P (h) =
Ch(h) · E(M |h)
E(M)
.
Define the fidelity of an implementation to be Ch(N = M), where N is the number of
times Beauty is told she will awaken and M is the number of times Beauty does awaken.
The variation distance between two discrete credence functions R and Q on a set S is the
quantity
v(R,Q) =
1
2
∑
h∈S
|R(h)−Q(h)|.
Under suitable hypotheses, Beauty’s credence in h is P (h) = Ch(h)·E(M|h)
E(M)
. Therefore,
if E(N) < ∞ then as fidelity approaches 1 Beauty’s credences converge in variation to
the distribution Q(h) = Ch(h)·E(N|h)
E(N)
. On the other hand if E(N) = ∞ then as fidelity
approaches 1 Beauty’s credence in h approaches zero for every h, and her credences diverge
in variation. In the former case, the distribution Q constitutes a stable solution to the
problem. In the latter case, there is no stable solution, meaning that individual agents
cannot avoid mortality estimates in establishing or even approximating their credences.
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This is consistent with CA and recovers the one-third solution, modulo agreement that
thirder Beauty may assign credence 13 + ǫ to heads for a smallish ǫ. Diehard thirders who
insist on ǫ = 0 meanwhile may indeed run afoul of CA per [8]. Where rational, however,
such thirders inhabit nomically (at least) inaccessible worlds.3
2. The theoretical solution: halfing.
In this section I’ll be explicating the halfing scheme of Lewis [6], which I think is attractive
and plausible but suffers from underdevelopment and somewhat mysterious motivation. As
I explained in Section 1, Beauty loses de se information which, on the naive view, is relevant
to heads. Lewis is not satisfied with the naive view, as for him Sleeping Beauty scenarios
involve what might be termed a “possible world sampling bias” (in the original problem,
for example, the tails world is oversampled). Employing this language, thirders adopt
sample (de se) proportions as their personal credences; Lewis prefers to adopt population
(objective chance) proportions. To get at these, one must correct the bias.
What I think is mysterious about the way Lewis sets things up concerns his use of the
following premiss: (L1) Only new relevant evidence, centred or uncentred, produces a
change in credence; and the evidence (H1∨T1∨T2) (sic) is not relevant to HEADS versus
TAILS. Here of course H1 is Monday heads, T1 is Monday tails and T2 is Tuesday tails.
This premiss makes no provision for loss of (de se or “centred”) information, or that such
information could be relevant to heads. In other words, it makes no provision for the naive
view. A move like that requires strong theoretical support, of which Lewis offers none.
One way of giving such support (while shedding light on some of the issues) is to make
use of the logarithmic scoring rule,4 where the agent with estimate p for P (heads) scores
the negative of surprisal, here log p if heads and log(1 − p) if tails. Assuming a fair coin,
minimum expected surprisal occurs at p = 1
2
(a calculus exercise). Of course, Beauty is
surprised twice if the coin lands tails, and some (namely thirders) will contend that her
surprisal is actually 2 log(1 − p) in this event, with minimum expectation at p = 13 . The
reason that both methods of accounting are defensible is that logarithmic scoring measures
distance (in bits) from omniscience, and there are (if one believes [5]) two legitimate
readings of omniscient, according to whether one admits de se information. Accounting
3At worlds supporting faithful implementations of SBSP and the like, the first thing
Beauty will try in her attempt to rectify GTP and CA will be to modify GTP (and
FSBI) with the language “In any Sleeping Beauty problem of finite expected duration....”
However, this still runs up against CA modulo the following principle of: Completeness:
Any rational agent must assign probability zero to any event h having the property that for
any x > 0 there are events k and E containing h such that P (k|E) exists and is less than
x. (In SBSP take k = h = (X = c) and E = (X ≤ n) for a largish n to conclude that
P (X = c) = 0.)
4Only the logarithmic rule is linear with respect to surprisal, which is the quantity
rational agents trafficking in information seek to minimize.
4
propositionally, if Beauty knows everything except tails, she is one bit shy of omnicience,
and is only charged one bit (logs are base 2). Under de se accounting practices, a halfing
Beauty gets charged two bits in case of tails, as her surprisals are doxastically independent.
If this is right, then even thirders might adopt a charitable attitude regarding efforts to
make sense of a one-half solution. I’ll be canvasing a few proposals in the following para-
graphs and checking them for soundness. The surprisal-minimization argument (together
with the sampling bias paradigm) can be taken as a guide; since only one tails surprisal
is to count, a policy of disenfranchisement is instituted, according to which Monday tails
and Tuesday tails versions of Beauty, between them, get counted only once, whether by
stipulation, lots or weighted average. Apportionment by equally weighted lots or averages
amounts to acceptance of Elga’s indifference principle, and is the more common choice.
Unequal lots or asymmetric stipulation is championed in Hawley [3], where it is maintained
that Beauty should assign credence 1 to Monday (and thus in particular to Monday condi-
tioned on tails). Strangers to disenfranchisement may find it worrisome that Hawley will
be updating credence in heads to 1 upon learning that Monday tails does not obtain, but
what troubles me more is that the choice seems arbitrary–could not one just as easily assign
credence 1 to Tuesday conditioned on tails? Hawley writes: “the best compromise...might
well be to believe to degree 1 that it is Monday whenever she awakens. She will be surely
be right on Monday, and possibly never be wrong about the day during the experiment.”
What about Muesday, though, which is like Monday whenever the coin lies heads and like
Tuesday whenever the coin lies tails? In favor of this grueish day one might counter: “the
best compromise...might well be to believe to degree 1 that it is Muesday whenever she
awakens. She will be surely be right on Muesday, and possibly never be wrong about the
day during the experiment.” Halfers are on thin ice already; arbitrariness is pushing it.
Respect for symmetry, then, seems to advise that halfers accept Elga’s principle. Halfers
that do include Lewis, Meacham [7] and probably White [11], albeit not explicitly. Even
among halfers agreeing on this much, however, there are differences in how propositional
credences are updated in light of de se evidence. No method comes cheap; Lewis’s policies
lead famously to Beauty counterintuitively (it is claimed) updating credence in heads to 23
when she learns Monday during an awakening. Meacham meanwhile (White too, I think)
abandons the multiplication rule P (A∧B) = P (A)P (B|A). The latter concession is more
costly, as I now illustrate by a brief sidequest through well-trodden probability lore.
Suppose that a big prize is hidden behind one of three doors, each with equal objective
chance. The hypothesis Door i corresponds to the state of affairs in which the big prize
is behind Door i. If Door 1, then Beauty will have a single awakening, on Monday. If
Door 2, Beauty will have a single awakening, on Tuesday. And, if Door 3, Beauty will have
two awakenings, on Monday and Tuesday. Halfers of course assign each of the alternatives
credence 13 upon awakening.
Suppose now that a halfer asks what day it is, and after hearing the answer is asked for
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her updated credence in Door 3. Note: if the answer is Monday, this rules out Door 1. If
the answer is Tuesday, this rules out Door 2. Door 3 cannot be eliminated. Recall that
our halfer has prior credence 13 in Door i for each i and, if she accepts Elga’s principle,
Monday and Tuesday are equally likely conditioned on Door 3. Suppose our halfer learns
thatMonday obtains. Then her predicament derives from a protocol (see [9]) isomorphic to
that of the Monty Hall problem, and corresponds to the situation in which the contestant
has initially chosen Door 3 and seen the hypothesis Door 1 eliminated.
Accordingly, any halfer who updates credences by conditioning on not Door 1 is commit-
ting the well-known fallacy of those who answer 12 in the Monty Hall problem. Namely,
conditioning on the proposition learned instead of on the fact that it, among other candi-
date propositions, was learned. On the contrary, Beauty’s credence in Door 3 must remain
1
3 . White and Meacham, who update propositional credences in response to de se evidence
by conditioning on the largest propositional event consistent with that evidence, fall for
the fallacy; Lewis gets it right.
How, though, are we to reconcile Lewis’s counterintuitive consequences?5 Most people,
even thirders, acknowledge that the the objective chance of heads is still 12 , as they might
imagine advising someone outside of the experiment, but when it comes to advising 23 after
learning Monday, they balk. I believe that, taken together, these intuitions are wrong, and
wrong for the same reason that naive Monty Hall intuitions are wrong. Namely, they
ignore the role of protocol–in this case, the protocol by which the communication with the
person outside of the experiment was arranged. If the person outside knows this protocol,
he won’t condition on Beauty’s evidence per se but on the fact that it came to him. And,
as I’ll elaborate on below (in a betting context), on the most natural protocols for which
he would take Beauty’s initial advice of 1
2
at face value, he would take 2
3
at face value
when Beauty had learned that it was the first day of the experiment.
There are, moreover, powerful statistical precedents for the coherence of Lewisian updating,
at least at the level of mathematics. For an artificial example, Lewis’s policies would
be vindicated were we to force Beauty to subject one of her tails versions to electoral
disenfranchisement by requiring her to mail herself a postcard during each awakening and
to then read her credence in heads off of a single (randomly selected if multiple) postcard
Wednesday morning. Less artificially, they agree in spirit and letter with standard methods
of accounting for biased sampling.
Suppose for example that a lake contains catfish and sunfish. If you go fishing, two-thirds of
the fish you catch are sunfish, but you know that individual catfish, being bottom feeders,
are only half as likely to get hooked as individual sunfish. Asked for the correct proportion
5If it isn’t counterintuitive enough that he assigns credence 23 to heads conditioned on
Monday, consider that he sticks by this even when the coin is not to be flipped until
Monday night, or that by iterating the erasure procedures over shorter and shorter time
frames on Monday, one can drive credence in heads arbitrarily close to 1.
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of catfish, you may wonder whether “sample proportion” or “population proportion” is
intended. If the latter, you will correct the sampling bias (typically using sample weights,
where in this case individual catfish turning up in samples are given twice the weight of
individual sunfish) and answer 12 . Suppose moreover that half the sunfish are warmouth
and half are bluegill. Equal numbers of catfish, warmouth and bluegill appear in catch
samples, but if a fish is selected from the lake uniformly at random and is found not to
be a bluegill, the probability that it’s a catfish will be 2
3
. What’s going on with Lewis
appears to be strongly analogous.6 So, if one takes divergence of de se credences from
objective chance in Sleeping Beauty scenarios to be an undesirable artifact of tails world
oversampling, it’s plausible that one should do exactly what Lewis does: correct the bias
in formulating what might be called “post-theoretic” personal credences.
In light of these considerations, a rather idiosyncratic picture emerges. One version of tails
Beauty7...either Monday’s version or Tuesday’s, is viewed as a redundant copy, and counts
for nothing. Eccentric as it is, though, any argument for thirding that doesn’t address it
in detail risks begging the question. For example, Weintraub in [10] (Horgan [4] is another
example, but with fewer awakenings) considers a scenario in which Beauty is to have three
awakenings in either case and finds out during an awakening that (more or less) it is either
Monday heads, Monday tails or Tuesday tails. She argues that the correct credence in
heads here is 13 , and that the original problem is analogous. But by Lewis’s lights the cases
are different, and in fact he too assigns heads credence 13 in hers.
Another argument against Lewis is that he appears to violate reflection. Indeed, suppose
that Beauty awakens at 9:00, is told what day it is at 9:05 and it informed about the
outcome of the flip at 9:10. Then for Lewis her expected credence in heads at 9:07 Monday
is 23 , and she knows this on Sunday night. By reflection, ought not she update to
2
3
then? The answer is of course no, but why? We can answer this by analogy with an
apparent violation of reflection in the example of the prisoner (see [0]). Suppose a prisoner
is waiting on a possible stay of his execution from a governer, which he expects to receive
with probability 1
2
. There is a light in his cell that a meticulous guard has agreed to turn
off at midnight if the stay is granted. There is no clock in the cell. As we advance toward
midnight, the prisoner sees his credence in stay drop from 12 to some lower value L. Let’s
say the expected value of L is α. (There is a heuristic argument suggesting that α ≈ 13 ,
but nothing turns on this.) The prisoner knows all of this; does reflection require him to
update his credence in stay to α now, at 6 P.M.? Of course no again...but why?
The resolution, hinted at earlier, is that reflection applies not to expected credences at
6If you think this example is disanalogous, imagine instead that all of the sunfish are
changelings, spending half of their lives as warmouth and half as bluegill; in a uniform
sample now, 2
3
of the non-bluegill are catfish.
7Selected at random. Or half of each, as one might imagine doing in versions of the
problem where Beauty’s body is replicated, but Beauty’s soul is divided, in case of tails.
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future times but to expected credences upon conditionalization on partitions.8 That’s not
what happens here. First, conditioning on the state S of his internal clock alone (as if
marking time in a blindfold) does nothing to his credence in stay, and what reflection
implies about a subsequent partitioning on there being light or not is that
P (stay) = P (stay |S) = P (on|S)P (stay|S ∧ on) + P (off |S)P (stay|S ∧ off );
it does not imply that P (stay |S) = P (stay |S ∧ on). The prisoner’s credence drops in
response to conditionalization on evidence, then, but not in response to conditionalization
on a partition. The same is true for a Lewisian Beauty’s 2
3
credence in heads at 9:07 on
Monday.9 What reflection implies about partitioning on the current day is that
P (heads) = P (Monday)P (heads|Monday) + P (Tuesday)P (heads|Tuesday);
it does not imply that P (heads) = P (heads|Monday).10
Well, we’ve seen thirding and several forms of halfing. Theory aside, whether or not these
schemes are any good depends on the existence or non-existence of reasonably natural
applications. So suppose that, during an awakening, Beauty gets a call from her bookie,
Rango Maleficent. Rango explains that there is an opportunity to bet on the coin toss,
and he needs to know her credence in heads. How should she respond, if she wishes to
be invulnerable to a Dutch book? How should she respond if she knows that it’s Monday
(or Muesday)? As previously noted, her appropriate responses are underspecified, because
they depend on the protocol by which Mal’s call was put through. Some possible protocols,
in decreasing order of “naturalness”: (1) call to come in each day of the experiment–Beauty
adopts thirder credences. (2) exactly one call to come in, Monday and Tuesday equally
likely conditioned on tails–Beauty adopts Lewisian credences. (3) single call to come
in on the first (respectively last) day of the experiment–Beauty engages in Hawley-style
(respectively Muesday-style) halfing.
8Somewhat more generally, reflection is valid at almost surely finite future times de-
pending only on evidence gathered up to that time, i.e. stopping times; reflection in this
context follows from the bounded martingale stopping theorem. Where time and evi-
dence are discrete, this is equivalent to conditionalization on countable partitions, which
is simpler.
9Nor is 9:07 Monday a stopping time for a half-half disenfranchiser; in fact it fails to be
finite almost surely, as it is never reached conditioned on Tuesday, i.e. never reached by
the half that is disenfranchised on Monday.
10Disenfranchisement also allows halfers to dodge the apparent violation of inverse re-
flection entailed by the contrapositive of the argument given for thirding in Section 1;
if Monday tails is disenfranchised, then on Tuesday Beauty’s credences revert to those
not of Monday (which has been disenfranchised), but of Sunday, while if halves of each
are disenfranchised, Monday and Tuesday exist in parallel, not series (different halves are
disenfranchised, if you will), so the credences of each revert to those of Sunday.
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I’ve maintained that proper credences in Sleeping Beauty scenarios are underspecified.
Thirding is the most natural choice and coheres, at nomically accessible worlds, with
countable additivity of credences, but Lewisian halfing, the frontrunner among halfing
schemes, has not been refuted by thirders. They aren’t without resources; a fair case might
be made that disenfranchisement is a just-so move that jurymanders personal credence into
false accord with objective chance. I have conflicted feelings about this. For while thirders
might have Truth on their side, surely Lewis has Beauty on his.
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